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I.   INTRODUCTION 
On May 10, 2013, President Barack Obama announced the 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).1 The document 
describes foci of the policy, which include: (1) improving our 
awareness of activities, conditions, and trends in the Arctic 
region that may affect our safety, security, environmental, or 
commercial interests;2 (2) protecting the Arctic environment 
and conserving its resources;3 (3) establishing and 
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1. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION (2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf [hereinafter 
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION]. 
2. Id. at 6. 
3. Id. 
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institutionalizing an integrated Arctic management 
framework;4 (4) charting the Arctic region;5 and (5) employing 
scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase 
understanding of the Arctic.6 Two of the guiding principles in 
accomplishing the strategy are: “decisions . . . based on the 
most current science and traditional knowledge” and 
engagement “in a consultation process with Alaska Natives 
. . . .”7 NSAR also calls for improved international cooperation 
and collaboration in the Arctic,8 a call that was echoed by 
Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski in a recent forum on Arctic 
issues held in Washington, D.C. on September 16.9 
Shortly following the release of the NSAR, the United States 
Coast Guard released its supporting strategy for the Arctic 
region on 10 May 2013, aligned to its federally designated 
missions that principally provide for safety and security. 
USCG followed that strategy with a comprehensive 
implementation plan in December 2015. Included in these 
documents are the task to specifically address assistance 
coordination and environmental response. 
Strengthening U.S. efforts in support of the Arctic, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security chartered a new university 
center of excellence, the Arctic Domain Awareness Center 
(ADAC) in summer 2014. ADAC, which is hosted by the 
University of Alaska, supports DHS, USCG and U.S. maritime 
missions in the Arctic region by developing and transitioning 
technology solutions, innovative products, and educational 
programs and to improve situational awareness and crisis 
response capabilities. A unique project within the center’s 
efforts is research in support of community-based observation 
for situational awareness. In a complimentary manner, the 
University of Idaho’s Center for Community Resilience 
provides research to strengthen community-based 
preparedness and response. 
Similarly, the United Nations’ Hyogo Framework (HFA) has 
three strategic goals: to integrate disaster risk reduction into 
                                               
4. Id. at 9, 11. 
5. Id. at 2. 
6. Id. at 8. 
7. Id. at 3. 
8. Id. at i. 
9. Senator Lisa Murkowski, Address at the Forum on Arctic Issues (Sept. 16, 2015). 
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sustainable development policies and planning; to develop and 
strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build 
resilience to hazards; and to systematically incorporate risk 
reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency 
preparedness, response and recovery programs.10 To achieve 
these goals, the HFA outlined five specific priorities for action: 
(1) making disaster risk reduction a priority;11 (2) improving 
risk information and early warning;12 (3) building a culture of 
safety and resilience;13 (4) reducing the risks in key sectors;14 
and (5) strengthening preparedness for response.15 
There are multiple levels of efforts in the Arctic that can 
contribute toward these policies. They include: (1) basic science 
to understand the dynamics of Arctic change including its 
dynamics within the circumpolar North, its connectivities to 
other global regions, and the consequences to regional and 
global livelihoods and well-being;16 (2) the politics of Alaska 
(i.e., state and national), perhaps one of the most visible, yet 
least pragmatic, components;17 and (3) the adaptation actions 
which comprise the pragmatic responses on the ground.18 
Adaptation actions bring together both science and politics but 
despite the many research papers, databases, and roundtables 
focusing on the Arctic, this area has received little attention. 
Although considerable scientific monitoring has been 
conducted in the Arctic, instrumented records of 
environmental conditions in Alaska and in other Arctic regions 
present their own set of problems. Ocean surface current 
sensors, ocean buoy networks, and ocean subsurface glider 
observations, as well as terrestrial gauges and meteorological 
                                               
10. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–
2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, ¶ 12, U.N. 
DOC. A/CONF.206/6 (Mar. 16, 2005). 
11. Id. at 6. 
12. Id. at 7. 
13. Id. at 9. 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. Id. at 12. 
16. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1; U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ROADMAP (2014), http://ppec.asme.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/CCARprint.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
ROADMAP]. 
17. See Fran Ulmer, Alaska and the Arctic, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 161, 163–64 (2014). 
18. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC, supra note 1; CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION ROADMAP, supra note 16. 
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stations, are sparse and records often do not extend far back in 
time, or records are kept for a limited time period and are then 
discontinued.19 Additionally, the reliability and validity of 
instrumented data in Alaska and Alaskan waters are 
questionable for a variety of reasons.20 Sensors are placed in 
populated areas and near shore locales; because the geographic 
area of the Arctic is vast and the conditions are harsh, many 
areas of the Arctic are not populated and therefore no sensors 
exist.21 The need to deploy sensors lies in the criticality of 
observing change: high frequency radars are used for 
monitoring ocean surface currents in the Chukchi Sea; an 
ocean buoy network provides continuous ocean acidification 
monitoring in the Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea, and Gulf of 
Alaska; the distributed biological observatory provides 
biological, chemical, and physical monitoring for change 
detection; and glider observations are used to establish a time 
series of subsurface ocean conditions.22 The Alaska Ocean 
Observing System (AOOS) is a regional data steward for many 
of these observations and data and makes information 
products available through its online data portal, including 
community-based observing data for the Bering Sea.23 Most 
recently, the new Arctic Information Fusion Capability (AIFC), 
which operates out of the Arctic Domain Awareness Center 
(ADAC), provides a means to organize and integrate diverse 
data streams with machine learning so as to provide an 
unprecedented knowledge system for decision support. Such 
observations and systems are necessary to ensure that 
appropriate responses are mounted to undesired changes, 
opportunities are utilized, and security is sustained for 
everything from food and water resources to incursions into 
                                               
19. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD AN INTEGRATED ARCTIC OBSERVING 
NETWORK 85 (2006); ALASKA OCEAN OBSERVING SYSTEM, http://www.aoos.org (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
20. See Douglas L. Kane & Sveta L. Stuefer, Reflecting on the Status of Precipitation 
Data Collection in Alaska: A Case Study, 46 HYDROLOGY RESEARCH 478 (2015); 
Samuel Bauret & Svetlana L. Stuefer, Kenai Peninsula Precipitation and Air 
Temperature Trend Analysis, 19TH INT’L NORTHERN RESEARCH BASINS SYMP. & 
WORKSHOP 35 (2013). 
21. Kane & Stuefer, supra note 20, at 478. 
22. See ALASKA OCEAN OBSERVING SYSTEM, http://www.aoos.org (follow “Access 
Data” hyperlink; then follow “Arctic Portal” hyperlink; then in the top left search box, 
type and search the name “Chukchi”). 
23. See id. 
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U.S. territorial waters.  
Relevant to this, through the Division of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) vast range of agencies focused on ensuring 
domestic security, is the National Response Framework 
(NRF).24 Under NRF, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) sets out five overview areas (prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery)25 under three 
key theme areas (engaged partnerships, scalability, flexibility, 
adaptability in implementation, and integration among the 
frameworks).26 Emphasizing the need to focus on these and 
other aspects of decentralized, community-based observing, 
preparedness and response, is the recent decision by Shell Oil 
Corporation and other oil and gas entities to indefinitely 
suspend operations in the Arctic.27 Since these organizations 
historically provided much of the critical response support in 
remote regions we must now address an alternate set of 
models to ensure safety and security in America’s Arctic. 
Toward this end, this article focuses on “engaged 
partnerships” in the context of the NRF’s overview areas; and 
establishes a means to improve our awareness of activities, 
conditions, and trends as well as to increase the collection of 
scientific knowledge and the use of traditional knowledge as 
set forth in the NSAR.28 Engaged partnerships can be 
considered to be working relationships that are sustained by 
regular communication and active support between response 
agency leaders and local-level organizations and individuals. 
This article also proposes that policies formalizing the 
incorporation of community based observing networks 
(CBONS) and the establishment of an integrated response 
framework (IRF) focusing on the maritime domain will 
                                               
24. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (2013), 
http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK]. 
25. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM, 
http://www.fema.gov/mission-areas (last updated Oct. 2, 2015). 
26. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) – 
FACT SHEET, www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRFOnePageFactSheet.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
27. See generally A. Hardee, Taking Stock of Oil Drilling’s Wildlife Impact: Center 
for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 40 Ecology L.Q. 541 (2013); J.D. Unger, Regulating 
the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory Reforms to Protect Alaska’s Arctic 
Environment form Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31 Alaska L. Rev. 263 (2014). 
28. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1. 
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accomplish many of the goals of both the NSAR and the NRF.29 
Use of such a system will enhance observation networks and 
preparedness, as well as response entities and actions. These 
elements will come together to create a whole that respects the 
enormous diversity in the Arctic and acknowledges that a 
shared arctic geography requires a different approach, and 
policies, to collective response. A comprehensive framework 
requires the use of a socio-environmental and technological 
systems-based approach focusing on key indicators with 
simple, robust and accessible models for interactions that 
allow us to forecast Arctic Critical Events (ACE) in the form of 
a regional, community-centered, early-warning system.30 In 
this context we define ACE as any biological, infrastructure, 
maritime shipping, or other natural or social event that is 
detrimental to society or the environment and necessitates a 
timely response in order to ameliorate deleterious effects 
caused by the event. 
Community Based Observing Networks and Systems 
(CBONS) are used to observe Arctic events and changes and to 
record scientific evidence.31 Broader observing networks are 
used to prepare for ACE, and an IRF facilitates cooperative, 
time-critical, and successful responses to a range of those 
events.32 In addition, an IRF requires federal and state 
agencies to develop a plan that equips remote communities to 
assist in response-on-the-ground for a range of ACE. Historical 
precedent exists for a network of skilled observers and on-the-
ground responders in remote areas who are able to put these 
                                               
29. Id.; NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24. 
30. See generally Francois Fouinat, A Comprehensive Framework for Human 
Security, 4 CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 289 (2004); Noriko Fujita Fukita et al., A 
Comprehensive Framework for Human Resources for Health System Development in 
Fragile and Post-Conflict States, 8 PLOS MED. 1 (2011), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001146; U.N. 
DEV. PROG., JOINT COMMUNITY-CENTERED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
GOVERNMENT OF COOK ISLANDS, NIUE, SAMOA AND TOKELAU/ UN JOINT COMMUNITY-
CENTERED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
http://www.ws.undp.org/content/dam/samoa/docs/prodocs/UNDP_WS_CCSDP_ProDoc.
pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (examples of comprehensive frameworks using both 
socio-environmental and technological systems-based approaches). 
31. See Lilian Alessa et al., The Role of Indigenous Science and Local Knowledge in 
Integrated Observing Systems: Moving Toward Adaptive Capacity Indices and Early 
Warning Systems, 11 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 91, 92 (2016). 
32. See Christian Huggel et al., Early Warning Systems: The “Last Mile” of 
Adaptation, 93 EOS 209, 210 (2012). 
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data into situational context: the Alaska Territorial Guard 
(ATG).33 During World War II, the ATG was commissioned to 
alert the U.S. to enemy activities in the seas and skies of 
Alaska.34 All in all, the ATG operated as a system of observers, 
first responders, defenders, and people to stock caches along 
flight corridors and coastal routes.35 The hazards faced in 
World War II are similar to some of the challenges faced today 
by responding agencies such as the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG), particularly in the Bering and Chukchi Seas regions. 
Alaska was considered too remote and vast to outfit with the 
needed level of equipment and too distant from the contiguous 
U.S. to be of relevance and to effectively protect,  an echo of 
similar challenges faced today.36 General Malin Craig, U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff, said in November 1937, “. . . the mainland 
of Alaska is so remote from the strategic areas of the Pacific 
that it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which air 
operations therefrom would contribute materially to the 
national defense.”37 
In the context of this article, we will specifically advance 
arguments for inclusion of CBONS in the NRF, the USCG 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS),38 and the Arctic Strategic 
Plan,39 in order to create a system to forecast ACE, prepare for 
their actuality, and mount a rapid response. Such a framework 
could better enable local and regional responses around an 
“Observe-Prepare-Respond” paradigm (Figure 1). We define 
observing as quality-assured and quality-controlled 
documentation of social, physical, and biological data that 
provides a baseline for detecting changing patterns and 
subsequently preparation and response. Preparedness is 
defined as the use of observing system outputs to derive 
awareness of potential critical events and the forecasting of 
                                               
33. Ernest Gruening, Introduction to MUKTUK MARSTON, MEN OF THE TUNDRA: 
ESKIMOS AT WAR 1 (1969). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 2, 3. 
37. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
38. U.S. COAST GUARD, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
(CONOP) (2007),  
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/Resources/RRTDocument1/$FILE/N
RF_USCG_CONOP.PDF. 
39. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1. 
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their emergence, leading to a rapid, yet organized, response. 
Observing and preparation are consequently the foundations 
for response, which we describe as any systematic and 
proactive set of actions to address critical events. The United 
States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on 
April 24, 2015 and will retain the chair until 2017.40 The 
opportunity to create such a blueprint toward arctic national 
preparedness, response, and resilience, hereafter referred to as 
the Integrated Response Framework (IRF), will challenge the 
United States and its interests in the Arctic region for the 
remainder of the United States’ chairmanship. The 
consequences of failing to produce such a blueprint, while the 
United States is chair, may tarnish its legacy. 
II.   WHY A SYSTEMS-BASED APPROACH? 
A key challenge for the science of scholarly inquiry and 
actions responding to changing environments in Alaska is that 
there are multiple disciplinary effects that remain 
disconnected. In addition, despite an urgent need to respond, 
the key variables, mechanisms, and processes that can 
maximize adaptive capacity and response on the ground by 
human communities are neither well-understood nor 
effectively operationalized.41 The tangible consequence of these 
challenges is that our organization for successful response at 
multiple spatial scales remains poor. 
The themes of anticipating threats and translating that 
knowledge into adaptive capacity are pillars of President 
Obama’s NSAR42 and his Executive Order on Preparedness 
and Resilience.43 Key goals of the strategy and the executive 
order include fostering national awareness of the Arctic, 
bolstering maritime regimes, enhancing public-private 
relationships through a national concept of operations, 
identifying necessary authorities, and recognizing future 
                                               
40. Arctic, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2016). 
41. See Nathan L. Engle, Adaptive Capacity and its Assessment, 21 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 647 (2011); Jochen Hinkel, “Indicators of Vulnerability and Adaptive 
Capacity”: Towards a Clarification of the Science-Policy Interface, 21 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 198 (2011). 
42. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1. 
43. Exec. Order No. 13653, 70 Fed. Reg. 66819 (Nov. 6, 2013). 
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requirements and resources that lend themselves to success.44  
The Arctic strategy and executive order also encourage 
advances in science and technology intended to facilitate 
successful response in the region.45 In addition, the UN HFA 
priorities emphasize that there remains a need to develop 
quantitative indices for “adaptive capacity” that aggregates 
diverse information across time, affected systems and regions, 
and impact metrics.46 Toward this we propose a systems-based 
approach that consists of: (1) using CBONS to place 
observations in a situational context; (2) developing a 
community-centered early warning system capable of 
forecasting ACE; and (3) developing new policies and an IRF 
for partnering with local communities to both train and equip 
them to be first responders in conjunction with regional, state 
and federal response agencies as anticipated in the NRF.47 
When considering a framework or blueprint for responding 
to change, it is necessary to incorporate three components: (1) 
social components, including policies, laws and governance; (2) 
biogeophysical components, including the inherent types and 
rates of change in ecosystems; and (3) technological 
components, including the range of technologies that are both 
driving socio-environmental change, and the availability to 
respond to them.48 In order to do this, there must be 
systematic observations of change, placement of these 
observations of change in both a situational and anticipatory 
context for ACE, and then targeting preparedness such that 
response actions can occur quickly with the best likelihood of 
success (IRF). 
                                               
44. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1, at 6. 
45. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1; Exec. Order No. 
13653, supra note 43. 
46. See generally HANS-MARTIN FÜSSEL, REVIEW AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
INDICES OF CLIMATE CHANGE EXPOSURE, ADAPTIVE CAPACITY, SENSITIVITY, AND 
IMPACTS 8, 8–8 (2009); Rosina M. Bierbaum & Marianne Fey, World Development 
Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, 1 WORLD DEV. REP. 53077 (2009), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11831971/world-development-
report-2010-development-climate-change. 
47. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24. 
48. Lilian Alessa et al., BEST PRACTICES FOR INTEGRATING SOCIAL SCIENCES INTO 
SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS SCIENCE: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR BUILDING A MORE 
RESILIENT AMERICA 2 (2015). 
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Figure 1. The need to adopt a systems-based 
approach to develop both ACE and the IRF. CBONS 
allow observations to be placed in a situational 
context. The vast array of arctic natural and social 
sciences can provide input to the forecasting system 
(ACE), and an integrated response framework (IRF) 
allows targeted preparedness, training and 
equipment to be mobilized in partnership with 
responding agencies. 
 
 Using Community Based Observing Networks to Better  
 Enable Local Responses to Arctic Critical Events. 
 
Expansion of the federal government policies of outreach 
and inclusion of indigenous communities in decision-making 
will benefit the United States in accomplishing its goals of 
protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its 
resources, establishing an integrated arctic management 
framework, and employing scientific research and traditional 
knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic.49 This can 
be accomplished through CBONS, which use a set of human 
observers to provide comprehensive data, through observations 
of a range of environmental variables and events. 
Partnering with Indigenous communities to inform policy is 
not new in the United States. The Marine Mammal Protection 
Act of 1972 permits traditional harvest and involvement of 
Alaskan Native organizations and the Alaska Nanuuq 
                                               
49. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1. 
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Commission in the management system.50 Federal agencies, 
including the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, 
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, are 
required by regulation to consult with tribal entities.51 The 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA),52 and the 
State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP),53 also 
require outreach and consultation. CBONS are a logical 
extension of these regulatory requirements. 
The human observers who comprise CBONS systematically 
input observations and collaborate to create a knowledge 
network that constructs broader, regional-scale changes and 
dynamics from discrete sets of quality-controlled information.54 
The majority of these observers are indigenous peoples whose 
intimacy with their landscapes and waterscapes is high.55 
Observers can describe changes accurately and place them in 
an appropriate social context.56 Each observer is akin to a 
sensor and, linked together, they form a robust and adaptive 
sensor array that constitutes CBONS. CBONS are able to 
monitor changing ecological conditions (e.g., weather, sea 
state, sea ice, flora, and fauna)57 as well as anthropogenic 
                                               
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1423(c), 1388 (2012). 
51. 18 C.F.R. § 16.8 (2015). 
52. National Environmental Policy Act. 49 U.S.C. 5304(g) (2012); National 
Environmental Policy, 42 U.S.C. §§4321–4370(h) (2011) 
53. State Transportation Improvement, 25 C.F.R. § 170.106 (2015). 
54. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31; Sarah Roop et al., “We Didn’t Cross the 
Border; The Border Crossed Us: Informal Social Adaptations to Formal Governance 
and Policies by Communities Across the Bering Sea Region in the Russian Far East 
and United States, 5 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 69 (2015). 
55. See Fikret Berkes & Mina Kislalioglu Berkes, Ecological Complexity, Fuzzy 
Logic, and Holism in Indigenous Knowledge, 41 FUTURES 6 (2009); Sandra Grant & 
Fikret Berkes, Fisher Knowledge as Expert System: A Case from the Longline Fishery 
of Grenada, the Eastern Caribbean, 84 FISHERIES RES. 162 (2007). 
56. See Eddy Carmack & Robie MacDonald, Water and Ice-Related Phenomena in the 
Coastal Region of the Beaufort Sea: Some Parallels Between Native Experience and 
Western Science, 61 ARCTIC 265 (2008); Andy Mahoney et al., Sea-Ice Thickness 
Measurements from a Community-Based Observing Network, 90 BULLETIN OF THE 
AMERICAN. METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 370 (2009). 
57. See Lilian Alessa, supra note 31; Peter Collings, Economic Strategies, 
Community and Food Networks in Ulukhaktok, Northwest Territories, Canada, 64 
ARCTIC 207 (2011); James D. Ford & Tristan Pearce, Climate Change Vulnerability 
and Adaptation Research Focusing on the Inuit Subsistence Sector in Canada: 
Directions for Future Research, 56 CAN. GEO. 275 (2012); Dyanna Riedlinger, 
Responding to Climate Change in Northern Communities: Impacts and Adaptations 54 
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activities (e.g., ship traffic, human behaviors, and changing 
infrastructure).58 
An example of a longstanding, quality-assured, and effective 
CBONS is the Community-based Observation Network for 
Adaptation and Security (CONAS).59 CONAS is the evolution 
of the Bering Sea Sub-Network that was developed in 2007 in 
partnership with university scientists at University of Alaska 
Anchorage, arctic indigenous communities, and an NGO–the 
Aleut International Association, a permanent participant of 
the Arctic Council.60 CONAS utilizes distributed human 
observers as sensors across the Bering Sea in both Alaska and 
the Russian Federation to systematically observe and 
document artic environmental and globalization changes 
through co-developed surveys and questionnaires.61 In 
CONAS, over forty factors of environmental and globalization 
changes are observed within a socioeconomic context, and all 
observations are quality assured and controlled, meaning they 
are verified and validated.62 Changes monitored at the local 
level hold higher significance in terms of understanding the 
social processes that relate to biodiversity and the 
vulnerabilities inherent in a changing environment.63 These 
observations based on bottom-up realities are increasing 
communities’ abilities to plan, adapt and respond to a 
changing Arctic to ensure a secure and sustainable future. 
Just like an instrumented array, CBONS can be tested and 
calibrated. However, unlike fixed instruments, they consist of 
intelligent actors who are much more capable of parsing 
                                               
ARCTIC 96 (2001); Martin Tremblay, et al., Climate Change in North Quebec: 
Adaptation Strategies from Community-Based Research, 61 ARCTIC 27 (2007). 
58. See LILIAN ALESSA ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNITY-BASED OBSERVING: 
A NATIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT (2015), https://www.arcus.org/files/news-
items/files/cbonreport_03-06-16_final.pdf. 
59. See LILIAN ALESSA ET AL., CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA 
MONITORING SERIES REPORT NO.2, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK II: SHARING 
KNOWLEDGE, IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING, ENABLING RESPONSE – INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION ALLIANCE FOR A CHANGING ARCTIC 
(2011). 
60. See VICTORIA GOFMAN ET AL., CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA 
MONITORING SERIES, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK: PILOT PHASE FINAL REPORT 2009 
(2015). 
61. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 61. 
62. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31, at 6. 
63. Id. 
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information to better detect patterns (i.e., local knowledge for 
global understanding). Indeed, one of the most urgent needs 
that can be served by CBONS as part of the suite of integrated 
observatories is to support efficient and effective adaptation to 
environmental change. In order to better address the 
environmental questions put forward by society, observations 
that are placed in a clear set of social contexts must be better 
integrated into our current observatory models.64 As part of the 
White House’s string of recent press releases related to the 
Arctic, CBONS were a priority area for development within the 
U.S. Arctic Chairmanship as well as more broadly in the 
context of adaptation.65 In September 2015, the National 
Science Foundation’s Advisory Committee for Environmental 
Research and Education released its “Gold Report” in which 
CBONS are called out as a necessary mechanism to ensure 
effective response to a range of socio-environmental change: 
“There is enormous opportunity to leverage current observing 
networks to provide relevant data for adaptation actions at 
increasingly finer temporal and spatial scales, for example, 
through investments in community-based observing networks 
that harness place-based, local, and traditional knowledge.”66 
U.S. federal agencies have invested billions of dollars to 
support observation systems including those in the Arctic; 
state, local, and private-sector entities also have established 
significant observing capacities.67 Many of the existing 
observing systems provide significant value and are meeting 
needs relevant to specific agencies.68 However, because these 
systems were established under disciplinary and agency 
                                               
64. See James D. Ford & Tristan Pearce, supra note 57, at 277. 
65. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces 
New Investments to Enhance Safety and Security in the Changing Arctic (Sept. 1, 
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/01/fact-sheet-president-
obama-announces-new-investments-enhance-safety-and. 
66. See NAT’L SCIENCE FOUNDATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH & 
EDUCATION, AMERICA’S FUTURE: ENVTL. RESEARCH AND EDUCATION FOR A THRIVING 
CENTURY 24 (2015). 
67. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NOAA’S OBSERVING 
SYSTEMS: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE AN INTEGRATED, COST-EFFECTIVE, 
PORTFOLIO 13 (2014). 
68. See COMM. ON DESIGNING AN ARCTIC OBSERVING NETWORK, POLAR RESEARCH 
BOARD, DIV. OF EARTH AND LIFE SCIENCE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD AN 
INTEGRATED ARCTIC OBSERVING NETWORK (2007). 
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boundaries and continue to operate independently, the current 
overall suite of observation systems may not optimally address 
the NSAR and NRF goals.69 We know that there are critical 
redundancies and/or gaps, and an uneven level of integration 
and interoperability among observatories, which hampers our 
ability to use the data for preparing and responding to arctic 
change.70 These challenges fall within the DHS’s purview.71 In 
2008 DHS reorganized to include twenty-three agencies under 
its umbrella, including the USCG.72 Each of these agencies has 
established extensive and well thought out scopes, mandates, 
and missions.73 Though DHS continues to experience 
challenges from the monumental tasks of coordinating and 
communicating with diverse agencies, it has established a 
network of Centers of Excellence (CoE) that unite diverse and 
nationally recognized experts as partners around a common 
issue.74 One such CoE, the Arctic Domain Awareness Center 
(ADAC), came into being in 2014.75 Its mission is to provide a 
real-time coordinated system for maritime monitoring in the 
Arctic, with the USCG as its primary client.76 It includes 
CBONS as part of its research, education, and outreach 
portfolio.77 
                                               
69. Id. at 25. 
70. Id. at 11. 
71. See generally Scott Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63 (2008); FRANKLIN GRIFFITHS, ET 
AL., ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 244–60 (James Kraska ed., 
2011). 
72. See CATHERINE DALE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34455, ORGANIZING THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERAGENCY REFORM 
DEBATES (2008); HAROLD RELYEA & HENRY HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33042, 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REORGANIZATION: THE 2SR INITIATIVE (2005). 
73. RELYEA & HOGUE, supra note 72, at 8. 
74. See Louise Comfort, Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, 
Communication, Coordination, and Control, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189–93, (2007); 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CENTERS OF 
EXCELLENCE (COE), http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/centers-excellence 
(last visited April 4, 2016). 
75. ARCTIC DOMAIN AWARENESS CENTER,  
http://www. arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org (last visited April 4, 2016). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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III.  FORECASTING ARCTIC CRITICAL EVENTS: WHAT IS 
A REGIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM? 
The 2013 National Research Council report Abrupt Impacts 
of Climate Change: Anticipating Surprises identified one 
overriding need: early warning systems (EWS) that would be 
essential for anticipating, warning, and planning for future 
abrupt changes.78 The report, however, stopped short of 
describing in detail how to establish an early warning system, 
citing the need for additional expertise to adequately tackle 
this task.79 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) defines an EWS as: “[t]he set of 
capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and 
meaningful warning information to enable individuals, 
communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to 
prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to 
reduce the possibility of harm or loss.”80 The UN further 
qualifies that definition as follows: “[t]his definition 
encompasses the range of factors necessary to achieve effective 
responses to warnings. A people-centered early warning 
system necessarily comprises four key elements: knowledge of 
the risks; monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards; 
communication or dissemination of alerts and warnings; and 
local capabilities to respond to the warnings received.”81 
This annotated definition includes the range of factors 
necessary to integrate both a coupled socio-environmental and 
technological system (SETS) for effective response. Early 
warning systems exist for natural geophysical and biological 
hazards, complex socio-political emergencies, industrial 
hazards, personal health risks, and many other related 
hazards,82 but few EWS exist that account for the real-world 
                                               
78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 147. 
79. Id. at 164. 
80. U. N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, 2009 UNISDR TERMINOLOGY ON 
DISASTER REDUCTION 12 (2009),  
http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Christian Huggel, et al., Is Climate Change Responsible for Changing 
Landslide Activity in High Mountains? 37 EARTH SURF. PROCESS LANDFORMS 77 (2012) 
(discussing early warning systems from a geophysical perspective); Lilian Alessa, et 
al., supra note 31 (discussing early warning systems from a subsistence fishing and 
hunting perspective). 
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integration of social, ecological and technological systems so as 
to increase the effectiveness of on-the-ground responses by 
communities.83 Effective regional integrated EWS are co-
developed by diverse end-users such that the benefits are fully 
recognized. This requires both that trust be established and 
that the community or region must accept responsibility for its 
own future. The incorporation of local and place-based 
knowledge, through CBONS, in cataloging early warning signs 
will increase community-level response, responsibility and 
action.84 
In order to be economically feasible, a community-focused 
EWS should be considered. Such a system necessarily 
comprises four key elements: (1) knowledge of the risks; (2) 
monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards; (3) 
communication or dissemination of alerts and warnings; and 
(4) local or regional capacities to respond to the warnings 
received including training, equipment, and coordination.85 
The expression “end-to-end warning system” emphasizes 
that early warning systems need to span all steps from 
detection of critical changes to community response.86 Reliable 
early warning systems developed globally have been 
instrumental in saving lives and protecting assets and 
livelihoods.87 However, they have not yet been implemented in 
the U.S. as an integrated process for the purpose of 
anticipating both acute and chronic (threshold) changes that 
require intervention, specific preparedness, or adaptation 
through targeted responses. 
An essential first step is to develop a shared vision of the 
desired early warning system, with buy-in and incorporation of 
local and regional knowledge and capacity. Concerted 
connection with communities on the ground allows for the co-
prioritization of needs for preparedness and early warning and 
recovery. Incorporation of local and place-based, including 
                                               
83. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31. 
84. Id.; KIRSTY GALLOWAY MCLEAN, ADVANCE GUARD: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES – A COMPENDIUM OF CASE 
STUDIES (2009),  
http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/Publications/UNU_2009_Advance_Reading_Cop
y_Advance_Guard_Compendium.pdf. 
85. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31, at 10. 
86. See, U. N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, supra note 80. 
87. See Huggel et al., supra note 32. 
16
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss1/2
2016] INCORPORATING CBONS 17 
 
indigenous, knowledge can enhance regional EWS.88 
 
Forecasting Arctic Critical Events: An Arctic  
Early Warning System. 
 
 Having articulated a system that establishes an effective 
means for observation of Arctic critical events, we move to 
establishing a means for response through preparation. We 
assert that there are two profound failures in overall policy 
governing arctic preparedness and response: siloing across 
agencies and an over-reliance on top-down data inputs. These 
vulnerabilities are artifacts of a time when there was the need 
for different agencies to specialize in key areas. For example, 
within the USCG, preparedness and response plans for oil 
spills are separate from the mission area for search and 
rescue.89 Moreover, other agencies such as the Alaska Division 
of Homeland Security & Emergency Management,90 Alaska 
National Guard and the Alaska State Defense Force,91 and 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC),92 
as well as a range of private corporations’ incident response 
units, each operate under separate scopes and mandates. The 
State of Alaska has its own Emergency Operations Plan,93 as 
does the DEC94 and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.95 There 
are so many emergency response, operations, and incident 
                                               
88. See U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR 
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 2015–2030 23 (2015),  
http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf. 
89. See MERV FINGAS, THE BASICS OF OIL SPILL CLEANUP 19 (3d ed. 2012). 
90. DIV. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT., OUR MISSION, ALASKA 
DEP’T OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFF., https://www.ak-prepared.com (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2016). 
91. Alaska State Defense Force, ALASKA DEP’T OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFF., 
http://dmva.alaska.gov/ASDF/ASDF_JOC (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
92. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN: 
DEPARTMENTAL PROCEDURES IN THE EVENT OF A NATURAL OR MAN-MADE DISASTER 
https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/ppr/plans/adec_disaster.pdf. 
93. STATE OF ALASKA, DIV. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT., THE 
STATE OF ALASKA 2011 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN,  
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKdistrict/StateofAlaskaEmergencyOp
erationsPlan2011.pdf. 
94. See DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 92. 
95. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (2011), 
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKdistrict/StateofAlaskaEmergencyOp
erationsPlan2011.pdf. 
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plans for Alaska that it is difficult to differentiate 
responsibilities, overlaps, leverage points, and gaps. The 
agency with primary responsibility for maritime response in 
the Arctic is the U.S. Coast Guard.96 
There is a great deal of uncertainty around the rates and 
types of geopolitical and environmental changes that may 
drive the need for a response and hence, the risks that may 
emerge in the near to midterm future.97 Risk and uncertainty 
in Alaska are heightened because of the lack of infrastructure, 
including roads, and a marine geophysical environment setting 
with extremes of ice and darkness. Given the reductions in 
funding to the U.S. Coast Guard,98 it is unrealistic to expect 
the agency to cover all contingencies across a marine area with 
a combined total greater than that of the continental United 
States. 
We assert that “preparedness and response” will be more 
effectively implemented through CBONS. These networks can 
help coordinate responses of the numerous agencies listed 
above by placing communities at the forefront of observation 
(since they are strategically geographically located) and 
anticipation of threats or events, and by training community 
members as first responders. CBONS will concomitantly 
increase the capacity of the USCG and, in essence, increase its 
labor force. However, preparedness and response will require 
efforts beyond incorporating CBONS. Those efforts will include 
developing a forecasting system for ACE, which could be 
accomplished through the DHS ADAC. 
Developing a forecasting system for ACE can leverage past 
investments in characterizing the Earth system,99 improve our 
ability to detect and attribute global and environmental 
change, inform climate models capable of simulating long-term 
                                               
96. U.S. COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD ARCTIC STRATEGY (2013), 
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/docs/cg_arctic_strategy.pdf 
97. See DALE ET AL., supra note 72; RELYEA & HOGUE, supra note 72. 
98. See U.S. COAST GUARD, ALWAYS READY: 2013 PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS & 2015 
BUDGET IN BRIEF (2015), http://www.uscg.mil/budget/docs/2015_Budget_in_Brief.pdf. 
99. The term “Earth system” refers to the interactions of the Earth’s physical, 
chemical, and biological processes, including the land, oceans, atmosphere, and poles. 
It includes the planet’s natural cycles—carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur 
and other cycles—and deep Earth processes. See Earth System Definitions, GLOBAL 
CHANGE, 
http://www.igbp.net/globalchange/earthsystemdefinitions.4.d8b4c3c12bf3be638a80001
040.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
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climate change, and improve research related to 
environmental health, northern subsistence, natural and man-
made disasters, fresh water, and other critical societally-
relevant areas. It could also provide a means to identify 
priorities for repurposing existing observing systems, ranging 
from satellite-based remote sensing to CBONS, and/or make 
new investments. Key to developing this is a more concerted 
connection with the users of environmental change 
information, that is, a community-centered early warning 
system, so as to be able to respond effectively to their needs 
and partner with them for response operations on the ground. 
It will be important to connect information on emerging 
thresholds of change with improved preparedness ranging 
from equipment to training to planning and response. 
An ACE forecasting system can be established by first 
identifying a list of indicators and sub-indices necessary for 
integration into an Arctic EWS as defined by UNDISR.100 In 
Table 1, we propose a set of initial indicators that were 
selected based on: (1) primary, peer reviewed literature,101 (2) 
agency defined and identified parameters used in operations; 
and (3) the Delphi method.102 
 
Table 1. 
Type of Sensor Indicator Sub-Indices 
Remote Sensing 
Sea ice Extent, velocity, 
quality, pattern 
Marine debris Bulk, diffuse, rigid, 
unknown 
Roads, buildings, & ports  
Shipping patterns (AIS 
visible) 
Baseline, irregular, 
proximity to habitat 
Phytoplankton and 
marine algae 
Variation from baseline, 
pattern, density, types 
Oil / petrochemicals Location at unfamiliar 
places, density 
                                               
100. See U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, supra note 80, at 12. 
101. Alistair Smith et al., Remote Sensing the Vulnerability of Vegetation in Natural 
Terrestrial Ecosystems, 154 REMOTE SENSING OF ENVTL. 332 (2014). 
102. HAROLD A. LINSTONE & MURRAY TUROFF, THE DELPHI METHOD: TECHNIQUES 
AND APPLICATIONS 10–12 (2002). 
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Wetland drying / surface 
drying 
Rates 
Greening / browning 
(NDVI) 
Rates, types of 
vegetation, proximity to 
habitat, cause 
Phenology Increased uncoupling 
Ocean temperature Higher, lower, 
phenologically disjunct 
Coastlines Erosion (rates & 
patterns), proximity to 
habitat, proximity to 
infrastructure, 
sedimentation 
Buoy / 
Meteorological 
Station 
Ocean temperature Higher, lower, 
phenologically disjunct 
Salinity Higher, lower, pattern  
Microbes TBD 
Oil / petrochemicals Location at unfamiliar 
places, density, proxy 
indicators through 
oiling of wildlife. 
Precipitation / hydrology Increase, decrease, rate 
(e.g., drought/flood), 
proximity to 
infrastructure  
Phenology Increased uncoupling 
Species distributions / 
biodiversity 
TBD 
Community-based 
Observing 
Networks 
Marine transit patterns 
(AIS – dark/unfamiliar) 
Increased occurrence  
Fauna - familiar Frequency, body 
condition (e.g., lesions), 
behaviors 
Fauna – unfamiliar Occurrence, 
distribution 
Flora – familiar Frequency, productivity 
(e.g., berries, rhizomes, 
roots), condition 
Flora –unfamiliar Occurrence, 
distribution 
Phenology Increased uncoupling 
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Human activity – desired 
Human consequences-
anticipated 
TBD 
Coastlines Erosion (rates & 
patterns), proximity to 
habitat, proximity to 
infrastructure, 
sedimentation 
 
Additional steps to operationalize ACE include: 
Design Based on Current Theory: ACE will need to be 
able to detect critical shifts soon enough to intervene. In order 
to accomplish this, indicators (Table 1) will help guide 
observations. These indicators are variables for which there 
are: (1) easily accessible and reliable observations ranging 
from remote sensing to CBONS; (2) models capable of 
integrating these data streams; and (3) outputs on which 
decisions can be made. Clusters of weighted indicators will 
constitute warning suites. 
Identify Indicators and Indicator Clusters: Indicators 
are derived from currently observed variables for which we can 
regularly acquire data in near- or real-time. Gaps that are 
identified in critical indicators will help guide adjustments to 
existing observing networks and instruments. Weighting will 
occur through the Delphi Method, using expert input to 
construct clusters (weighted indicators that are integrated 
around an Incidents of National Significance (IONS)).103 
Identify Warning Suites: This involves mapping priorities 
outlined by Pacific Command, Northern Command, the U.S. 
Coast Guard and the Office of Naval Research to develop 
indicator clusters and creating attention categories: e.g., 
watch, adjust, respond.104 These categories specify what we are 
warning about and who is being warned. 
                                               
103. Incidents of National Significance, as defined in the NRF, are high impact 
events that require an extensive and well-coordinated multi-agency response to save 
lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community and economic 
recovery. See NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf. 
104. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-566, ARCTIC PLANNING: DOD 
EXPECTS TO PLAY A SUPPORTING ROLE TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND HAS EFFORTS 
UNDER WAY TO ADDRESS CAPABILITY NEEDS AND UPDATE PLANS (2015), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670903.pdf. 
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Develop Scenarios: Scenarios based on ACE integration 
models can help better guide preparedness and response by 
constructing scenarios of arctic critical events (also see IONS 
below) that have meaning to communities on the ground. 
Build Capacity: ACE can guide building preparedness and 
response capacity among different end users including 
management agencies, industries, tribal bodies, NGOs, and 
resident communities not only through scenario-building but 
also by changing culture. Currently, there is a great deal of 
willingness and desire on behalf of remote communities in the 
Arctic to be active participants at time zero of a critical event, 
such as a ship adrift spilling hazardous cargo (potentially 
requiring not only containment and neutralization but also 
rescue and housing of survivors and/or recovery of fatalities), 
because these residents could be severely impacted by the 
expected delays in a more centralized response.105 
 
ACE and Incidents of National Significance (IONS). 
 
IONS are high-impact events that require an extensive and 
well-coordinated multiagency response to save lives, minimize 
damage, and provide the basis for long-term community and 
economic recovery.106 However, the realities of response mean 
that success is variable and dependent on several assumptions 
and pre-conditions that may not be met. For example, one 
assumption is that the responding agency is capable of a 
timely mobilization which has not been compromised such that 
response-efficacy is reduced. Ideally, emergent responses can 
help off-set the burden of centralized response but a pre-
condition is that a degree of appropriate preparedness must be 
in place. In order to accomplish this, regional EWS that are 
heavily integrated need to be developed against IONS. Our 
primary concerns with IONS arise from both anthropogenic 
and naturally-derived events. Examples are as follows: 
1. Convergent environmental variables of changing sea 
ice, coastal erosion and increased ship transits puts 
coastal communities at risk for not only overt 
dislocation but also chronic problems associated 
                                               
105. See EPPR: Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Plan, ARCTIC COUNCIL, 
http://arctic-council.org/eppr/completed-work/oil-and-gas-products/arctic-guide/. 
106. See NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24. 
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with rapid changes in food species. 
2. Simultaneous malicious and purposeful interference 
and/or destruction of critical infrastructure and 
natural resources (e.g., cyber-jamming airport 
facilities, setting forest fires, disrupting ports, etc.) 
pre-dispose communities and national security to 
harm and can critically tax resources of responding 
agencies, compromising response. 
National, regional and local entities possessing integrated 
early warnings in the form of actionable and trusted 
information and knowledge of threat precursors are in a much 
stronger position to anticipate and prevent an incident or, 
should one occur, greatly reduce its impact on the societies 
they protect. 
IV.   TOWARD AN INTEGRATED RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK. 
The logical framework for a response framework is the NRF. 
The NRF emphasizes community engagement,107 which 
specifically speaks to policies around: (1) planning, (2) public 
information and warning; and (3) operational coordination. 
This phrase seems to anticipate the incorporation of CBONS 
into the NRF. Incorporating CBONS would enhance available 
information by adding a range of data streams, as well as on-
the-ground validation, to supplement existing data-streams, 
reduce costs, raise awareness within communities who 
participate in the observing network, and place observations 
into a societal context, which would further enable the 
accuracy of ACE. Additional values of CBONS lie in their use 
in guiding targeted preparedness, planning, workforce, and 
skills development. In the Arctic, where data streams are 
particularly limited and we are often “blind” during certain 
seasons, CBONS will be of particular utility. This model is 
readily transferable to other parts of the United States. 
As part of an IRF, not only should key observed/monitored 
variables and indicators of change be identified, including 
those obtained through CBONS, but these should also be 
                                               
107. See R. Perkins & R. Bullock, Indigenous Communities Participation in 
Environmental Decisions (2014),  
http://www.academia.edu/9410444/Indigenous_Communities_Participation_in_Enviro
nmental_Decisions. 
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mapped to the capabilities and resources most likely needed 
during an incident, including describing the responsibilities of 
primary and support agencies involved (Emergency Support 
Function Annexes).108 
Focusing on the relationships between determining the need 
to respond and effectively doing so requires more concerted 
connection with communities on the ground in the Arctic. This 
also serves to build buy-in and trust within these communities, 
mitigating the possibility of a compromised response plan that 
could arise if a lack of trust is present.109 In establishing this 
connection, communities are asked to prioritize needs (e.g., 
cultural and resource) so as to develop regional (e.g., state-
wide) indicators that can be used to develop a community-
based early warning system, leveraging the federal Climate 
Resilience Toolkit (CRT),110 and the Arctic Adaptation 
Exchange Portal (AAEP) in particular.111 These indicators can 
be weighted and represented as a status dashboard (Figure 2). 
Using the dashboard and algorithms for weighting variables 
over space and time, a regional EWS (i.e., ACE) and an IRF 
can be meaningfully used on the ground by non-specialized 
users. 
The information derived from observing networks, 
particularly with those comprised of community observers, 
forms the basis for continual monitoring of system changes. A 
community-based early warning system is at the core of the 
IRF. It is one that is co-developed, managed, and maintained 
by regional response agencies in coordination with the 
National Response Plan. It is based on a “people-centered” 
approach that empowers individuals and communities 
threatened by rapid and/or undesired changes to act in 
sufficient time and in an appropriate manner to reduce the 
possibility of injury, mortality, loss of well-being, damage to 
valued ecosystems, and/or loss of livelihoods (economic 
                                               
108. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 2004, 
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, at ESF-i, http://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf. 
109. See Ricardo Wray et al., Public Perceptions About Trust in Emergency Risk 
Communication: Qualitative Research Findings, 24 INT. J. MASS EMERGENCIES AND 
DISASTERS 45 (2006). 
110. U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://toolkit.climate.gov/ (last visited April 6, 2016). 
111. Arctic Adaptation Exchange, ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
WORKING GROUP, http://arcticadaptationexchange.com/ (last visited April 6, 2016). 
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viability). It provides communities, practitioners, and 
organizations involved in resource management with advance 
information of risks that can be readily translated into 
prevention, preparedness, and response actions. 
Integrating CBONS into any preparedness and response 
framework will require particular emphasis and focus on 
quality assurances, verification, and validation. It should be 
emphasized that, from a policy point of view, CBONS occupy a 
unique niche in the “citizen science” spectrum. As anticipated 
in this article and as utilized in Alaska, CBONS are not as 
vulnerable to “spoofing” or to misleading or inaccurate data.112 
Incorporating CBONS into preparedness and response 
frameworks is necessary because it is unlikely that we, as a 
nation, will be able to equip and mount a centralized set of 
responses should arctic activity continue to increase at a 
moderate rate. Thus, incorporating CBONS into ACE can: (1) 
guide purposeful observations; (2) facilitate successful 
responses by Alaskan communities; and (3) inform more cost-
effective planning and partnerships with local communities by 
state and federal agencies. This can be accomplished by: (1) 
helping manage data on observations of change; (2) integrating 
these data into critical event scenarios which bear realistic 
meaning to responding communities; and (3) combining 
engagement, workforce development, and better connections 
between communities and agencies. These elements enable 
responses to occur more quickly and effectively. 
 
Figure 2. The process of co-development of a 
community-centered, regional early warning 
systems with end-user communities as potential 
first responders. 
 
                                               
112. Of particular concern are “observer blogs” which allow anyone to post 
observations with little to no systematic data intake protocols. Such blogs are 
particularly vulnerable to spoofing and purposeful addition of misleading information, 
potentially introducing both a threat to security, as well as an inaccurate picture of 
changing conditions and events. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 48. 
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Thus, a regional, pilot IRF as a solution-generating system 
includes the process and framework that lead to successful on-
the-ground responses. Such a framework is illustrated in 
Figure 2 above and involves: 
1. An active stakeholder group that is part of a co-
designed framework and co-developed solutions 
(planners and responders). 
2. Identification and assembly of best available data 
(academic and agency scientists, local, and place-
specific, community-based knowledge). 
3. Data integration that acknowledges interoperability 
across diverse data types which can allow more 
realistic and accurate development of scenarios for 
planning and training. 
4. Suitable representation and visualization of SETS 
dynamics (e.g. geovisualization). 
5. Generation of a range of plausible future scenarios 
and projection of possible outcomes using 
geovisualization tools. 
6. Development of potential responses to scenarios to 
guide preparedness, co-develop and refine response 
plans such as targeting what kinds of training and 
equipment need to be provided. 
V.   INCORPORATING CBONS IN THE NATIONAL 
RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
Ultimately, we need to tackle the policies around 
preparedness and response in the Arctic, a region that 
presents unusual challenges of distance, extreme 
environments, and limited capacity to mount a centralized 
response. Several questions that arise regarding our abilities 
to develop a streamlined process of “observe-prepare-respond” 
range from: Who are we warning? What are we warning about? 
What is being threatened? What emerging opportunities might 
there be, as the converse of what the risks are? 
In this article, we have proposed a system capable of 
forecasting Arctic Critical Events that can detect important 
shifts soon enough to intervene from any one of a series of 
distributed communities who may be impacted. Most of the 
pieces currently exist and are functional but will require a 
new, adaptive way of thinking by DHS and the State of Alaska, 
as well as agencies such as the Department of Justice and 
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Defense which can play important roles in support of the NRF, 
thus enabling greater communication and operationalization 
on the ground. This will require a careful examination of the 
kinds of observations and integrated models necessary for 
building response scenarios. The challenges of data, planning, 
and response interoperability also need to be addressed so that 
any outputs from a forecasting system for ACE can highly 
accessible to communities on the ground, not just specialized 
groups within universities or agencies. 
By formally incorporating CBONS into the NRF, the 
challenges of communicating warnings may be met halfway 
because communities will have greater control of, and buy-in 
to, information regarding emerging changes that could 
potentially impact them, either positively or negatively. 
Ultimately, a re-consideration of CBONS as part of a range of 
observation, planning, and response frameworks will also 
elevate the diversity and skills within remote communities in 
Alaska. Increasing the human capacity to respond across such 
a vast region could greatly assist responding agencies and 
build improved trust between the public and government 
resulting in a more resilient Arctic. 
 
DISCLAIMER: The views and conclusions contained in this document are 
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily 
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. 
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